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Prosecutor v. Todorovic´: Illegal Capture as an
Obstacle to the Exercise of International
Criminal Jurisdiction
JAMES SLOAN*
Abstract
For years the majority of those individuals publicly indicted by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) remained at large due to a lack of co-operation from
states whose assistance was required to effect their arrest. In order to assist in this regard,
various operations have been undertaken since 1997 bywhichUN and regionalmissions have
taken steps to assist the ICTY in thedifficult taskof bringing accusedbefore theTribunal inThe
Hague. Suchstepswere taken in thecaseofStevanTodorovic´,whowascapturedand transferred
toTheHaguebymeans of anoperation shrouded in secrecy and alleged tohave involved illegal
behaviour on the part of the NATO-led Stabilization Force. The following article discusses the
nature of Todorovic´’s arrest (based on the limited facts available) and his various attempts to
have his indictment dismissed due to the nature of his arrest. In so doing, it considers the state
of the law regarding the appropriateness of an international judicial body proceedingwith the
trial of an individual brought before it by potentially illegalmeans. Although a plea agreement
was reached in the case, with the result that the judicial consideration of the issues is limited,
important issues are nevertheless raised in the arguments of the Office of the Prosecution and
the defence counsel which are likely to recur in similar cases in the future.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Stevan Todorovic´, a Bosnian Serb, was indicted by the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)1 on 21 July 1995 for crimes against Bosnian
Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and other non-Serbs. He was alleged to have committed
these crimes between 1991 and 1993 while he was chief of police in the Bosanski
SamacmunicipalityofBosniaandHerzegovina.2Hewaschargedwithcrimesagainst
humanity, grave breaches, andwar crimes arising from acts of rape,murder, torture,
sexual humiliation, and other cruelty.3 On 27 September 1998, after remaining at
* Lecturer in international law, University of Glasgow.
1. Also referred to as ‘the Tribunal’ or ‘the International Tribunal’.
2. He was indicted, along with several others, in what came to be known as the ‘Bosanski Samac’ or ‘Simic´’
indictment (after Blagoje andMilan Simic´, who were among those named in the same indictment).
3. Asnotedby theTrialChamber, ‘In the PleaAgreement the Prosecution andStevanTodorovic´ agree on certain
facts as being true and constituting the factual basis for the guilty plea’. (See Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorovic´,
Sentencing Judgment, CaseNo. IT-95-9/1-S, T. Ch. I, 31 July 2001, at para. 9.) These includedmurder, ordering
men to perform fellatio on each other, administering repeated beatings, ordering and participating ‘in the
unlawful detention and cruel and inhumane treatment of Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims and other
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large for almost three years, he was captured and transferred to the Tribunal under
circumstances which are – and are likely forever to remain – unclear. It was the
circumstances of his capture, coupled with an overriding desire on the part of the
ICTY’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) to keep them secret, that ultimately led to 26
of the 27 counts against Todorovic´ being dropped.
According toTodorovic´’s versionofevents, aswell asvariousmedia reports, on the
night of 27 September 1998, four armed, masked men burst into Todorovic´’s home
in Zlatibor inwestern Serbia, gagged, blindfolded, and beat himwith a baseball bat,4
thenproceededtosmugglehimoutof thecountryand intoBosniaandHerzegovina.5
Within a fewminutes of Todorovic´’s arrival in Bosnia andHerzegovina, a helicopter
arrived to takehim to the base of theNATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR)6 at Tusla.7
Depending onwhichnewspaper accounts (if any) are believed, those involved inhis
capture were either ‘bounty hunters’8 paid from a ‘CIA slush fund’,9 or members of
the British SAS and/or elite Delta units from the United States.10 According to one
account,hiscaptorshadofferedto lethimgoinreturnfor theequivalentof£13,000.11
While some of these reports seem far-fetched and elements may be unfounded,
because of thewall of secrecy erected by SFOR and strenuously defended by theOTP,
untested allegations and unconfirmed press reports are all we have to inform us of
what actually happened on the night of 27 September 1998.
In a complicated series ofmotions, Todorovic´ set out to show that his capturewas
illegal and raised the issueof the involvement of theOTPandSFOR. Inorder toprove
this assertion, Todorovic´ repeatedly asked for co-operation fromSFOR in the formof
theprovisionofdocumentsandtestimonyrelatingto thecircumstancesof thearrest.
This co-operation was not forthcoming. Ultimately, when it became clear that the
Trial Chamber was going to require disclosure from SFOR – despite the determined
effortsof theOTPandSFORtoprevent this–adealwas reachedandaPleaAgreement
was entered into between theOTP and Todorovic´. According to the terms of the Plea
Agreement, theOTPwould drop all counts but one against Todorovic´ and, in return,
Todorovic´ would no longer insist on accessing the SFOR documents and agree to
non-Serb civilians’, torture, forcing detainees to sign false confessions andordering deportations and forcible
transfers. Ibid., at para. 9.
4. At his initial appearance before the ICTY on 30 Sept. 1998 he advised the Trial Chamber that he ‘did not feel
well because he had received a heavy blow with a baseball bat over his head “during the kidnapping”’. See
Prosecution Response to the Appeal Brief of the Accused/Appellant Stevan Todorovic´, filed 4 Aug. 1999, at
para. 9, n. 8.
5. See S. Castle, ‘Bosnian Police Chief May Escape War Crimes Trial’, Independent, 16 Aug 2000, 11. See also T.
Walker, ‘SAS Carried Out Serbian Raid’, The Times, 11 Nov. 1998, at 15.
6. ‘IFOR (nowSFOR)was established byNATO inDec. 1995pursuant to theDaytonPeaceAgreement andunder
the authority of the United Nations Security Council.’ (See Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic´, Milan Simic´, Miroslav
Tadic´, Stevan Todorovic´, and Simo Zaric´, Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR
andOthers, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, T. Ch. I, 18 Oct. 2000, at para. 39.) ‘In 1996, Security Council Resolution 1088
(12 Dec. 1996) authorized the Member States . . . to establish SFOR as the legal successor to IFOR . . . .’ (Ibid.,
at 42).
7. Ibid., at para. 11.
8. See Castle, supra note 5. See also S. Davids, ‘NATO “Gang” Jailed Over Todorovic´’, Birmingham Post, 12 Dec.
2000, 9, where it is reported that ‘Nine Serbs who were allegedly paid £15,500 by NATO to capture and
smuggle [Todorovic´] into Bosnia, were yesterday jailed for kidnapping.’
9. See J. Swain, ‘Serb Snatched by Rogue Bounty Hunter’, Sunday Times, 23 July 2000, 25.
10. SeeWalker, supra note 5.
11. See Swain, supra note 9.
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co-operatewith theOTP in relation to the provision of information and evidence re-
garding theevents in the formerYugoslavia.12 As envisagedby thePleaAgreement,13
Todorovic´ was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for the single count to which
he pleaded guilty. Despite the protests of OTP officials that ‘Absolutely nothing has
been sacrificed’,14 in view of the gravity and extent of his crimes, it is fair to say that
Todorovic´ got off relatively lightly.
This article considers the nature of Todorovic´’s variousmotions relating to illegal
capture and the legal arguments advanced therein. In doing so, two other matters
where similar arguments have been raised before the ICTY – that of Prosecutor v.
Slavko Dokmanovic´ 15 and Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic´ 16 – are touched upon. Finally,
thediscussionwill consider the effects, if any,which the ICTY jurisprudence is likely
to have on the functioning of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
2. DOKMANOVIC´: PRE-TODOROVIC´
Slavko Dokmanovic´ was the first accused before the ICTY tomake a claim of illegal
capture.17 Dokmanovic´ had been charged with grave breaches and violations of the
laws and customs of war, and crimes against humanity in a confidential indictment
dated 3 April 1996. On 27 June 1997 Dokmanovic´ was arrested after being lured
from the town of Sombor, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY),18 into UN-
administered Croatia. The luring was a result of a combined operation by the OTP
and the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja andWestern
Sirmium (UNTEAS).19 Dokmanovic´ contended that the method of his arrest was
tantamount to kidnapping and violated ‘the Statute and Rules of the Tribunal, the
sovereignty of the FRY, and international law’.20 He further claimed that his right
not to be deprived of his liberty and security of person except in accordance with
legal procedureshadbeenviolated.21While theOTP freely conceded that it hadused
‘trickery’,22 it maintained that its actions were perfectly legal.
12. See Sentencing Judgment, supra note 3, at para. 5 et seq.
13. According to the terms of the Plea Agreement, both sides agreed that the OTP would recommend to a Trial
Chamber a sentence of not less than five years’ and not more than twelve years’ imprisonment and that
neither party would appeal. Ibid., at para. 11.
14. See J. Cogan, ‘International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects’ (2002) 27 Yale Journal
of International Law 111, at 127, where he remarked: ‘Deputy Chief Prosecutor Graham Blewitt said, rather
unconvincingly, that “Absolutely nothing has been sacrificed.” But Blewitt acknowledged that there had
been a recent decline in the number of arrests by SFOR and that “[he]would not be surprised if [the Todorovic´
case] had something to do with it”.’
15. Prosecutor v. SlavkoDokmanovic´, Decision on theMotion for Release by theAccused SlavkoDokmanovic´, Case
No. IT-95-13a-PT, T. Ch. II, 22 Oct. 1997.
16. Case No. IT-94-2-PT, T. Ch. II.
17. Foracloser lookat theDokmanovic´ caseseeM.Scharf, ‘TheProsecutorv.SlavkoDokmanovic´: IrregularRendition
and the ICTY’ (1998) 11 LJIL 369.
18. Consisting of Serbia andMontenegro.
19. Bait for Dokmanovic´ included the possibility of compensation for lands formerly held by him in Croatia
as well as promised meetings with an OTP investigator regarding atrocities Dokmanovic´ claimed were
committed by Croatians in the Vukovar area.
20. See Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanovic´, supra note 15, at para. 13.
21. In this regard he relied on Art. 9(1) of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and Art. 5(1) of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, reproduced and discussed at note 152, infra.
22. See Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanovic´, supra note 15, at para. 57.
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The Trial Chamber agreed, finding that the trickery used by the OTP did not
amount to ‘a forcible abduction or kidnapping’.23 Although Dokmanovic´ had been
‘deceived, tricked, and lured into going into Eastern Slavonia’, the conduct was
‘consistentwith theprinciples of international lawand the sovereigntyof theFRY’.24
Because of its determination that the capture was legal, the Trial Chamber did not
have to ‘decide . . . whether the International Tribunal has the authority to exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant illegally obtained from abroad’.25 This issue was to
present itself less than a year later in the Todorovic´ case.
3. THE TODOROVIC´ CASE
3.1. An overview of the legal process
Upon being presented to the ICTY in The Hague on 30 September 1998, Todorovic´
entered a plea of not guilty to all 27 counts against him, and began a long process of
filing motions for his release. Themotions filed by Todorovic´ were legion, and only
those directly related to the illegal capture will be discussed here.26 Referring to the
series of motions that will be discussed below, the OTP noted that
Regardless of the various characterizations given by the Accused to [his] numerous
Motions, they all essentially amount to an assertion that the manner in which he
was apprehended entitles him to the ultimate remedy of release from the Tribunal’s
custody and his repatriation to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.27
Todorovic´’s motions relating to illegal capture came in four waves:
1 a motion requesting an evidentiary hearing and disclosure from the OTP;
2 motions requesting judicial assistance to compel the production of informa-
tion from the FRY and SFOR;
3 motions requesting his release; and
4 a secondvolleyofmotions requesting judicial assistance to compel production
of information from the FRY, SFOR and the United States.
3.1.1. The motion for an evidentiary hearing and to compel disclosure from the OTP
In February 1999 Todorovic´ filed a motion requesting an evidentiary hearing on
matters relating to his arrest, detention, and delivery to the Tribunal. He further
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid. The Trial Chamber emphasized the fact that Todorovic´ left the FRYwillingly andwas not arrested until
he was outside that state.
25. Ibid., at para. 78 (emphasis in original).
26. The OTP described the motions brought by Todorovic´ as ‘many and various’ and the litigation itself as ‘long
and tortuous’. See para. 11 of the Prosecutor’s Response to Stevan Todorovic´’s ‘Notice of Motions for Judicial
Assistance’, filed 8 Dec. 1999. In fact, the motions in the case were so frequent and overlapping that the OTP
took the extraordinary step of issuing an Annex mapping out the procedural history of the case; see Ann. A
to the Prosecutor’s Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on a Motion for Judicial Assistance to be
Provided by SFOR and Others dated 18 Oct. 2000 or, Alternatively, Application for Leave to Appeal Against
that Decision and Request for a Stay of the Decision, filed 25 Oct. 2000.
27. See Prosecution Appeal and Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 26, at para. 8.
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requested: the right to give evidence in the matter; a discovery order directed to the
OTPtomakeavailablealldocuments initspossessionrelatingtohisdetention,arrest,
and delivery to the Tribunal; his return to the FRY; and dismissal of his indictment.28
He alleged that he was ‘illegally kidnapped by four unknown individuals in the
FRY’29 and argued that this raised ‘the issue of the Prosecution’s involvement in an
illegal abduction . . .’.30 He argued further that even if the OTP was not involved, the
method of capture still went to the legality of his being brought before the Tribunal.
The Trial Chamber orally rejected the motion on 4 March 1999 and, on 25 March
1999, issued a short written decision31 reaffirming its oral rejection of the Motion
and ruling that ‘theMotion does not contain sufficient factual and legal material . . .
to warrant an evidentiary hearing’.32 An appeal was denied,33 with the Appeals
Chamber finding in a 13 October 1999 Decision that it had no basis to intervene as
there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the Trial Chamber.34
3.1.2. Motions to compel disclosure from the FRY and SFOR
On 21 and 22 September 1999, while the above-discussed motion was still under
appeal, Todorovic´ brought motions seeking orders from the Trial Chamber for the
productionofdocumentsandwitnessesby theMinistryof the Interiorof theFRYand
by SFOR.35 He claimed that these materials would be necessary for the evidentiary
hearing that would result if he was successful in his then pending appeal.36 On
21 October 1999, in view of the fact that Todorovic´’s appeal was not successful (and
no evidentiary hearing was ordered to take place), the Trial Chamber dismissed the
motions.37
3.1.3. Motions for release
When it became clear that an evidentiary hearing was not to be ordered by the
Appeals Chamber (and that the Trial Chamber was not going to compel SFOR and
the FRY to provide documentation and witnesses in support of such a hearing),
28. As summarizedby theTrialChamber inProsecutor v. Blagoje Simic´,MilanSimic´,MiroslavTadic´, StevanTodorovic´,
and Simo Zaric´, Decision Stating Reasons for Trial Chamber’s Order of 4 March 1999 on Defence Motion for
EvidentiaryHearing on theArrest of the Accused Todorovic´, CaseNo. IT-95-9-PT, T. Ch. I, 25March 1999, at 2.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid. TheOTPdeniedhaving ‘prior information of any proposed operation to secure the arrest of the accused,
and [stated] that it first learned of the accused’s arrest on 27 Sept. 1998 when it was contacted by SFOR’.
(Ibid.)
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic´, Milan Simic´, Miroslav Tadic´, Stevan Todorovic´, and Simo Zaric´, Decision on Appeal by
Stevan Todorovic´ Against the Oral Decision of 4 March 1999 and theWritten Decision of 25 March 1999 of
Trial Chamber III, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, A. Ch., 13 Oct. 1999.
34. Ibid, at 2. The Appeals Chamber stressed that the issue before the Trial Chamber was not whether there was
a kidnapping andwhat its legal effectsmight be, but whether there was an abuse of discretion on the part of
theTrialChamber indecidingnot to grant an evidentiaryhearing into the allegedkidnappingof the accused.
35. Accused Stevan Todorovic´’s Motion for an Order Requesting and Ordering the Ministry of the Interior of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to Provide Documents andWitnesses, filed on
21 Sept. 1999; Accused Stevan Todorovic´’s Motion for an Order Requesting and Ordering Security Force for
Bosnia and Herzegovina to Provide Documents andWitnesses, filed 22 Sept. 1999.
36. See Prosecution Appeal and Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 26, Ann. A, at para. 6.
37. See Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic´, Milan Simic´, Miroslav Tadic´, Stevan Todorovic´, and Simo Zaric´, Order Denying
Motions for Orders of Assistance, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, T. Ch. I, 21 Oct. 1999.
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Todorovic´ changed tack somewhat – all the while relying on what he considered
to be his illegal capture as the basis of his course of action. On 21 October 1999,
some eight days after the Appeals Chamber denied Todorovic´’s appeal against the
Trial Chamber’s decision not to allow the Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing (and
the same day it denied his motion to compel disclosure from the FRY and SFOR),
Todorovic´ filed a motion asking that he be returned to the FRY.38 Here again he
based his request for relief on an assertion that his arrest was illegal, arguing that
it was in violation of state sovereignty and contrary to customary international
law.39 He attached to this motion a statement setting out his allegations regarding
the events surrounding his arrest and delivery to the ICTY.40 Shortly thereafter, on
15 November 1999, Todorovic´ filed a habeas corpus motion, yet again basing his
claim on allegations of illegal capture.41 The Trial Chamber issued an oral Decision
on 23 November 1999 in which it found that Todorovic´’s statement ‘was a new
circumstance such that it justified ordering an evidentiary hearing on the legality
of the arrest and detention of the Accused’.42
3.1.4. Motions to compel disclosure from SFOR, the United States, and the FRY
On 24 November 1999, the day after the Trial Chamber ordered an evidentiary
hearing, Todorovic´ brought a further motion seeking an order that SFOR provide
him with documents and witnesses ‘relating to [his] abduction, kidnapping and
detention’.43 In the words of the Trial Chamber, the purpose of the motion was ‘to
secure certain information and documents, which the accused believes to be in the
custody and control of SFOR, and which will assist him in his motions challenging
the legality of his arrest’.44 Todorovic´ also sought similar documentation from the
OTP.45
On 7 March 2000 the Trial Chamber ordered the OTP to provide Todorovic´ with
all relevant reports and material in its possession, including the identity of the
individuals involved in Todorovic´’s arrest, as well as to inform him of the steps it
had taken to obtain relevant information fromSFOR.46 On 8May 2000, following an
unsuccessful appeal against the 7 March 2002 Order,47 the OTP made the required
disclosure. However, in thewords of the Trial Chamber, it ‘provided only a one-page
report about the arrest of the accused, prepared by the investigator who effected
the arrest on 27 September 1998, Mr Ole Brøndum. The Prosecution asserted that,
38. SeeNoticeofMotion foranOrderDirecting theProsecutor toForthwithReturn theAccusedStevanTodorovic´
to the Country of Refuge, filed 21 Oct. 1999.
39. See Prosecution Appeal and Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 26, Ann. A, at para. 7.
40. Ibid.His decision to file a statement represented a change, as Todorovic´ had previously been unwilling to file
an affidavit or to testify absent special measures; see Prosecution Response to the Appeal Brief, supra note 4,
at paras. 16 and 17.
41. Accused Stevan Todorovic´’s Petition for aWrit of Habeas Corpus, filed 15 Nov. 1999.
42. Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic´, Milan Simic´, Miroslav Tadic´, Stevan Todorovic´, and Simo Zaric´, Decision on the
Application for Leave to Appeal against the Trial Chamber Decision of 7March 2000, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, A.
Ch. (Bench), 3 May 2000, at 3.
43. See Prosecution Appeal and Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 26, Ann. A, at para. 12.
44. See Decision onMotion for Judicial Assistance of 18 Oct. 2000, supra note 6, at para. 59.
45. Ibid., at para. 3.
46. Order on Defence Requests for Judicial Assistance for the Production of Information, issued 7March 2000.
47. See Decision on Leave to Appeal of 3 May 2000, supra note 42.
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apart from this report, it had none of the designated material within its custody
and control.’48 Given the OTP’s representation that it possessed nothing but this
one-page report on the subject of Todorovic´’s arrest, the robust nature of its refusal
to provide it from February 1999 toMay 2000 seems extraordinary.
This lack of information from the OTP, when combined with SFOR’s refusal to
co-operatewith respect toTodorovic´’s requests,49 resulted in theTrial Chamber, on1
June 2000, ordering that SFORfile a response to theMotion for Judicial Assistance.50
A hearingwas initially scheduled for 23 June 2000, but, to accommodate requests by
SFOR, was twice rescheduled and was ultimately held on 25 July 2000. SFOR, in the
end, decided not to attend the hearing.51 In a filing on the same day as the hearing,
‘the Defence specified the relief it sought, including, for the first time, a request for
judicial assistance directed at theUnited States of America’.52 And the filings did not
end there: in early August 2000, after the hearing and pending the Trial Chamber’s
decision, Todorovic´ brought anothermotion requesting judicial assistance from the
FRY.53
In its Decision of 18October 200054 the Trial Chamber orderedwhat to somewas
theunthinkable: that by 17November 2000 SFORand theNorthAtlanticCouncil, as
well as the 33 states participating in SFOR, provideTodorovic´with evidence relating
to his arrest, including the identities of the individuals who were involved in his
arrest. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber issued a subpoena requiring the testimony
of the commanding general of SFOR, ‘the highest ranking military officer in the
United States of America’.55
3.1.5. The events following the 18 October 2000 Decision
On26October 2000, theOTPfiledadocument appealing against the18October 2000
Decision to the Appeals Chamber and calling on a Bench of the Appeals Chamber
48. See Decision onMotion for Judicial Assistance of 18 Oct. 2000, supra note 6, at para. 4. The OTP’s position on
this point drew questioning from the Trial Chamber in reply to which it stated that it had complied with all
orders of the Trial Chamber and had produced ‘every document it ever had in its possession related to the
arrest of Mr Todorovic´’. Ibid., at para. 31.
49. Todorovic´ had received a ‘letter from the Office of the Legal Advisor of SFOR, Colonel JamesM. Coyne, dated
24March 2000, declining to provide thematerial sought and stating: “It is the position of SFOR that the ICTY
has no authority to order SFOR to disclose any information”’. Ibid., at para. 5.
50. Scheduling Order for Hearing on DefenceMotion for Judicial Assistance, issued 1 June 2000, in which SFOR
was directed to file a written response by 16 June 2000. See Prosecution Appeal and Application for Leave to
Appeal, supra note 26, Ann. A, at para. 22.
51. SFOR did, however, submit a written response to the motion; see SFOR Submission, filed 10 July 2000.
52. See Decision onMotion for Judicial Assistance of 18 Oct. 2000, supra note 6, at para. 7. Also on 25 July 2000,
Todorovic´ ‘filed a Defence Notice to Trial Chamber as to Specific Relief Sought on Motion for Judicial Assistance and
asked the Trial Chamber to issue an “Order and Subpoena Duces Tecum for the Commanding General of
SFOR”, an “Order and Subpoena Ad TestificandumDirected to General Shinseki”, and a “Request for Judicial
Assistance to United States of America”’. See Prosecution Appeal and Application for Leave to Appeal, supra
note 26, Ann. A, at para. 28.
53. ‘On 1 Aug. 2000 the Accused filed Accused Stevan Todorovic´ ’s Motion Requesting Judicial Assistance from the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [Serbia and Montenegro] to Provide Documents and Witnesses . . . and a statement
in support thereof.’ See Prosecution Appeal and Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 26, Ann. A, at
para. 30.
54. See Decision onMotion for Judicial Assistance of 18 Oct. 2000, supra note 6.
55. See Prosecution Appeal and Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 26, at para. 22, where he is so
described.
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to grant it leave to appeal.56 On 2 November 2000, a series of communications was
received by the Appeals Chamber57 from NATO and several of its member states58
calling for a review of theDecision and for its stay. On 8November 2000 theAppeals
Chamber suspended the execution of the Decision and requested interested parties,
including the OTP, to submit written briefs by 15 November 2000.59 Todorovic´ was
given until 22 November 2000 to file a written response, and an oral hearing was
ordered for 28 November 2000.
In Decisions issued by the full Appeals Chamber on 4 December 200060 and by a
Benchof theAppealsChamberon5December2000,61 theAppealandApplicationfor
Leave to Appeal of the OTP were rejected, the former because the Appeals Chamber
held that there was no right of appeal as the motion decided in the impugned
decision was not
a preliminarymotion as defined by Rule 72(A) of the Rules [of Procedure and Evidence
of the Tribunal] and that therefore there can be no right of appeal under Rule 72(B)(i)
of the Rules . . . 62
The latter – embarrassingly for the OTP63 – was rejected because the Bench of the
Appeals Chamber ruled that the OTP had filed its appeal a day late.64
Perhaps anticipating that it was not to succeed in its appeals, by the time the
Decisions rejecting the Appeal and the Application for Leave to Appeal were is-
sued, the OTP had already entered into the Plea Agreement with Todorovic´, dated
28 November 2000. By its terms, Todorovic´ would plead guilty to one count
56. AnAppeal to theAppeals Chamber and anApplication for Leave toAppeal directed to a Benchof theAppeals
Chamber were both contained in a single filing by the OTP marked as having been filed on 25 Oct. 2000
(ibid.). The document was, however, determined by the Appeals Chamber to have been filed on 26 Oct. 2000,
a difference that proved to be very significant; see note 64 and accompanying text, infra.
57. See Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic´, Milan Simic´, Miroslav Tadic´, Stevan Todorovic´, and Simo Zaric´, Decision and
Scheduling Order, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, A. Ch., 8 Nov. 2000.
58. These included Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the
United States. A communication was also filed on 2 Nov. 2000 by Denmark; however, it did not explicitly
state whether it was seeking a review of the Trial Chamber’s Decision. Ibid., at 2. For a summary of the
arguments raised by the United States in its brief filed before the Appeals Chamber on 15 Nov. 2001, see
S. Murphy, ‘ICTY Order for Disclosure of Information by NATO/SFOR’ (2001) 95 AJIL 401, at 402.
59. See Decision and Scheduling Order, supra note 57, at 3.
60. Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic´, Milan Simic´, Miroslav Tadic´, Stevan Todorovic´, and Simo Zaric´, Decision on Interlocu-
tory Appeal Filed by Prosecutor on 26 Oct. 2000 from Trial Chamber Decision Dated 18 Oct. 2000, Case No.
IT-95-9-PT, A. Ch., 4 Dec. 2000.
61. Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic´,MilanSimic´,MiroslavTadic´, StevanTodorovic´, andSimoZaric´, DecisiononApplication
for Leave toAppeal filed by Prosecutor on 26Oct. 2000 fromTrial ChamberDecision dated 18Oct. 2000, Case
No. IT-95-9-PT, A. Ch. (Bench), 5 Dec. 2000.
62. See Decision onApplication for Leave to Appeal of 5 Dec. 2000, ibid., at 2. Rule 72(B)(i) of the Rules allows for
interlocutory appeals as of right only against decisions on preliminary motions challenging jurisdiction.
63. Particularly so, in view of the fact that, as the Appeals Bench points out, provision exists for the request
of an extension of time under Rule 127 and the OTP did not ask for such an extension. See Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 60, at 2.
64. A direction by theOTP to the effect that it ‘deemed’ the relevant dates to be different from those indicated by
the Registry found little favour with the Trial Chamber. According to Rule 73(C), an application to a Bench
of the Appeals Chamber for leave to appeal must be ‘filed within seven days of the filing of the impugned
decision’. The OTP felt entitled to ‘deem’ the date of the decision it was appealing to be 19 Oct. 2000, rather
than considering it to have been filed on 18 Oct. 2000, as indicated by the Registry. The OTP further noted its
view that its own document was filed in the ‘late afternoon of 25 Oct. 2000’ rather than on 26 Oct. 2000. See
Prosecution Appeal and Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 26, at para. 1, n. 2.
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(persecution as a crime against humanity) among the 27 against him and he would
agree to
withdraw all motions pending before the Trial Chamber relating to the evidentiary
hearing regarding the circumstances of his arrest andhis request for judicial assistance.
Specifically, he would withdraw the allegations that his arrest was unlawful and that
SFOR or NATOwas involved in any unlawful activity in relation to his arrest.65
On 29 November 2000 the OTP and counsel for Todorovic´ filed a joint motion
disclosing the terms of the Plea Agreement to the Trial Chamber.66 On 13December
2000 Todorovic´ entered a plea of guilty to the single count67 and, on 31 July 2001,
the Trial Chamber sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment less the nearly three
years he had spent in custody awaiting the outcome of his case.68 No appeal was
filed against the Sentencing Judgment, and on 12 December 2001 Todorovic´ was
transferred to Spain to serve his sentence.69
3.2. The legal arguments
It is clear from Todorovic´’s various motions that his goal was to rely on the nature
of his capture and the sensitivities of SFOR, NATO, and the OTP to disclosure of any
information relating thereto, in order to obtain his release and the withdrawal of
the charges against him. The OTP, for its part, had two goals in the case which were,
at times, incompatible. First, it wanted to prevent Todorovic´ from gaining access to
SFORdocuments in order to ensure the continued co-operationof that organization.
Second, it wanted to ensure that justice would be done and that Todorovic´ – and
potentially other accused captured in similar circumstances – would be unable to
rely on his method of capture as a means to gain his release. The ultimate result in
the case (26 out of 27 of the charges against Todorovic´ being dismissed in return for
his renouncing his right to access SFOR information) appears to be a vindication of
Todorovic´’s strategy and may be an indication that the OTP’s desire to ensure that
SFOR did not have to disclose any information relating to the capture of Todorovic´
was itsprimaryconcern, surpassingall else, including itsdesire toensure theaccused
did not escape justice.70
The focus of the arguments that emerged in response to Todorovic´’s motions71
varied somewhat depending on whether they were being advanced by SFOR or the
65. Http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index. htm.
66. See Sentencing Judgment, supra note 3, at para. 4.
67. Ibid., at para. 5.
68. Ibid., at para. 117.
69. See supra note 65.
70. The OTP’s concern with preserving the secrecy of SFOR was so great that it formally requested the Trial
Chamber for prior notice of any decision it might make compelling SFOR to provide documents so that the
OTP could decide whether to withdraw the indictment altogether. See Prosecutor’s Response to the ‘Notice
ofMotion for Evidentiary Hearing onArrest, Detention and Removal of Defendant Stevan Todorovic´ and for
Extension of Time toMove to Dismiss Indictment’ filed by Stevan Todorovic´ on 10 Feb. 1999, filed on 22 Feb.
1999, at para. 53.
71. Most arose in his Motions to compel disclosure from SFOR, the USA and the FRY; see section 3.1.4, infra.
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OTP. In short, the arguments of the OTP and/or SFORwere as follows:72
1 that the Tribunal lacked the authority to order the disclosure from SFOR;
2 that there was no prima facie basis for the Trial Chamber to order a judicial
inquiry;
3 that concerns regarding SFOR’s operational security should prevent the Trial
Chamber frommaking the requested order;
4 that, even assuming that the facts were as alleged by Todorovic´, there should
be no disclosure ordered fromSFORbecause the facts did not entitle Todorovic´
to the remedy sought; and
5 that there was no unlawful breach of the FRY’s sovereignty.
3.2.1. Lack of authority on the part of the ICTY to order disclosure from SFOR
The argument that theTrial Chamber lacked the power to order disclosure occupied
the bulk of the Trial Chamber’s attention.73 This argument was primarily advanced
by SFOR.74 The Trial Chamber took it as read that it had the power to issue binding
orders on states,75 but examined the question of whether it had a similar power
against SFOR. In addressing this, the Trial Chamber considered the establishment
of SFOR, its relationship with the ICTY,76 the scope of Article 29 of the Statute of
the ICTY,77 and the jurisprudence of the ICTY on similar issues, and concluded that
it was ‘competent to issue a binding order under Article 29 of the Statute to the
33 participating States of SFOR, and through its responsible authority, the North
Atlantic Council, to SFOR itself’.78 Judge Robinson, in his Separate, Concurring
72. There was considerable overlap between the arguments of the OTP and SFOR. With the exception of
arguments 1 and 3, the arguments are primarily considered herein in themanner theywere advanced by the
OTP.
73. See Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance of 18 Oct. 2000, supra note 6, at paras. 38-58. The argument
occupied at least three-quarters of the Trial Chamber’s legal reasoning.
74. Initially the OTP also advanced the argument, but it later capitulated on the point. The OTP had originally
‘contended that the power to order SFOR to produce documents was not a power that the Trial Chamber
had . . . ’. Later, however, it stated that ‘although therewere potential circumstances underwhich it would be
appropriate for the Trial Chamber tomake such an order, it was not appropriate in this particular situation’.
Ibid., at para. 31.
75. In support of this finding the Trial Chamber relied on Article 29 of the Statute of the ICTY (which obliges
states to co-operate with the ICTY in its investigation and prosecution, including an obligation to arrest and
surrender ICTY indictees), Rule 54bis of the Rules of Evidence (which provides for orders for the production
of documents to be directed to states) and its previous jurisprudence (Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blasˇkic´, Judgment
on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, Case
No. IT-95-14-AR108, A. Ch., 29 Oct. 1997). Ibid., at paras. 37 and 38.
76. Which includes a power on the part of SFOR to detain ICTY indictees and transfer them to The Hague. Ibid.,
at paras. 43–45.
77. Based on a ‘purposive construction of the Statute’, the Trial Chamber found that ‘Article 29 should . . . be read
as conferringon the InternationalTribunal apower to require an international organizationor its competent
organ such as SFOR to cooperate with it in the achievement of its fundamental objective of prosecuting
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law, byproviding the severalmodes
of assistance set out therein.’ Ibid., at para. 48.
78. Ibid., at para. 58. The Trial Chamber noted its intention to follow an earlier decision in the Kordic´ case
involving documents requested ‘from the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) and then
from its responsible authorities, the Presidency of the European Union Council and the Commission of
the European Union. When no documents were produced in response to such formal requests, the Trial
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Opinion, considered the principle behind the finding:
As a matter of principle . . . the Tribunal must be competent to order an arresting au-
thority to produce certainmaterial relevant to the arrest of a personwho is challenging
the legality of his arrest; otherwise, that person’s right under customary international
law to mount such a challenge may be seriously prejudiced and even nullified. No
legal system, whether international or domestic, that is based on the rule of law, can
countenance theprospectof apersonbeingdeprivedofhis liberty,while its tribunalsor
courts remain powerless to require the detaining or arresting authority to produce, in
proceedings challenging the legality of the arrest, material relevant to the detention or
arrest; in such a situation, legitimate questions may be raised about the independence
of those judicial bodies.79
3.2.2. Absence of a prima facie case
A second argument – and one that was quickly dispensed with – was the OTP’s
assertion that there was no prima facie basis for a judicial inquiry. Once again the
OTPcharacterized thedefendant’s request for informationas a ‘fishingexpedition’,80
and asserted that
no credible evidence has been put forward to indicate that members of the Office of
the Prosecutor or of any other institution, including SFOR, have violated the rights of
the accused.81
In the light of the fact that theOTPhadbeenmaking the identical argument since
Todorovic´’s firstmotionwasfiled in February 1999,82 it appearedunlikely towin the
day. In fact, the argument appeared to do little but antagonize the Trial Chamber,
which noted:
TheProsecution sought to argueoncemore that there is nobasis in the evidence to date
which entitled Todorovic´ to obtain suchmaterial. As the Trial Chamber, in its Order of
7 March 2000, has already held that there is such a basis, and as the application by the
Prosecution for leave to appeal against that decision was refused, it is not open to the
Prosecution to re-agitate that issue now.83
3.2.3. Arguments relating to SFOR’s operational security
Arguments that to provide the requested disclosurewould jeopardize SFOR’s opera-
tional securitywere primarily, though not exclusively,84 made by SFOR. In response
Chamber issued an Order requiring the various Member States of the European Community at the time
of establishment of the ECMM to produce the relevant documents.’ Ibid., at para. 54. See Prosecutor v. Dario
Kordic´ et al., Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Order for the Production of Documents by the European Community
MonitoringMission and its Member States, T. Ch. III, 4 Aug. 2000.
79. Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic´, Milan Simic´, Miroslav Tadic´, Stevan Todorovic´, and Simo Zaric´, Separate Opinion of
Judge Robinson, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, T. Ch. III, 18 Oct. 2000, at para. 7.
80. Ibid., at paras. 2 and 16.
81. Ibid., at para. 16.
82. See Prosecution Response of 22 Feb. 1999, supra note 70, at paras. 17–23. The argument was again made and
was squarely rejected by the Trial Chamber in its 23 Nov. 1999 Decision to order an evidentiary hearing; it
was made yet again by the OTP and again rejected by the Trial Chamber in its Order of 7 March 2000, supra
note 46.
83. SeeDecision onMotion for Judicial Assistance of 18Oct. 2000, supranote 6, at para. 59 (emphasis in original).
84. Counsel for Todorovic´ took exception to theOTP’s advancing an argument based on SFOR security concerns
(ibid., at para. 17), given that theOTP did not represent SFORnor, presumably, have any special knowledge of
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to these concerns, Todorovic´ had signalled a willingness ‘to reach an acceptable
resolution that would address both the Defence need for information and SFOR’s
concern to protect its security andoperationalmethods’.85 Such an approach,which
would have seen SFOR engaging with counsel for the accused in a discussion of
mutual concerns relating to the information, was rejected by SFOR – to its ultimate
disadvantage. In dismissing SFOR’s objections relating to national security, the Trial
Chamber noted that ‘It was open to SFOR to make specific objections to the disclo-
sure of particular documents or othermaterial at the hearing . . . but SFOR chose not
to do so.’86
3.2.4. Arguments that the motion should be dismissed because Todorovic´ was not entitled to
the relief he sought
From the start,87 the main strategy of the OTP – a strategy later adopted by SFOR –
was to attempt to convince the Trial Chamber that there was no need for Todorovic´
to have details of the circumstances surrounding his arrest in order to conduct
his defence. This was so, the OTP argued, because it was willing to ‘proceed to a
determination of the merits of this action on the basis of the current record viewed in
the light most favourable to the Defence’.88 As such, it argued, there were no facts in
dispute, merely the legal conclusions to be drawn therefrom dealing with what an
appropriate remedy might be. As to the question of remedy, the OTP asserted that,
because Todorovic´’s allegations were not sufficiently grave, the requested remedy
– dismissal of the indictment and immediate release – was unavailable to him. To
make such an order would have been an abuse of the Trial Chamber’s discretion89
and have the added disadvantage of alienating SFOR (which had shown itself to be a
staunch ally of the Tribunal). It would appear that the OTP framed the issues in this
way as part of a strategy of refocusing the issues away from the question of whether
Todorovic´ had a right to access SFOR documents, instead directing the attention of
the nature of its security concerns. The OTP latermodified its approach somewhat, arguing that an order for
disclosurewould jeopardize the voluntary co-operation of states and organs such as SFOR: ‘Any requirement
by the Tribunal that such states and entities disclose such details to the Tribunalmay lead to awithdrawal of
theirwillingness toprovide suchvoluntary assistance. Thiswouldbe contrary to the interests of theTribunal
and would seriously jeopardize its ability to fulfil its mandate.’ See Prosecution Appeal and Application for
Leave to Appeal, supra note 26, at para. 21.
85. See Decision onMotion for Judicial Assistance of 18 Oct. 2000, supra note 6, at para. 26.
86. Ibid., at para. 60.
87. An argument that the motion should be dismissed because Todorovic´ was not entitled to the requested
relief was made by the OTP in response to Todorovic´’s first motion in Feb. 1999 requesting an evidentiary
hearing and disclosure from the OTP; see Prosecution Response of 22 Feb. 1999, supra note 70, at para. 24 et
seq.TheTrial Chamber, in itsOralDecision of 4March 1999 and its subsequentWrittenDecision of 25March
1999, supra note 28, did not, however, address this argument, as it decided the matter on other grounds. See
discussion at section 3.1.1, supra.
88. See Prosecution Appeal and Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 26, at para. 5 (emphasis in original).
The OTP was willing to proceed to a determination of the merits of the case ‘even on the assumption that
all facts alleged by the Defence have been proven’. See Prosecution’s Response to the Defence Notice to
Trial Chambers as to Specific Relief Sought on Motion for Judicial Assistance, filed 31 July 2000, at paras.
23 et seq., as referred to in Prosecution Appeal and Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 26, at para.
5, n. 4. The willingness of the OTP to take the allegations of the accused to be true was ‘solely for the sake
of argument in relation to the accused’s Motion. The Prosecution does not otherwise concede or contend
that the circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused and his transfer to the Tribunal involved any
violation of international law.’ See Prosecution Response of 22 Feb. 1999, supra note 70, at para. 26.
89. See Prosecution Appeal and Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 26, at para. 5.
ILLEGAL CAPTURE AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 97
the Trial Chamber to the question of the appropriateness of Todorovic´’s requested
remedy.
For the OTP’s argument to have succeeded, the Trial Chamber would have had
to accept both of its aspects: (a) that Todorovic´’s allegations had been accepted by
the OTP and therefore his having access to SFOR documentation to advance his
defencewas no longer necessary; and (b) that on the ‘agreed’ facts, Todorovic´’s claim
to release and dismissal of the charges against himwas not sustainable. As we shall
see, the Trial Chamber was not convinced by the first argument; as such, it did not
consider the second.
This first aspect of the OTP’s argument appears to be fundamentally flawed: it
asks the Trial Chamber to find disclosure unnecessary because the ultimate remedy
is not available on the facts – but the very purpose of the disclosure is to reveal to Todorovic´
what the facts are. 90 The only way in which the argument could be convincing
would be if the OTP could satisfy the Trial Chamber that the disclosure could not
under any circumstances lead to the requested remedy. While the OTPwaswilling to
make such an extraordinary assertion91 (somethingwhich is particularly surprising
coming from a body which had earlier represented that the extent of the material
it possessed on the circumstances of the arrest was a one-page report92), the Trial
Chamber appeared to disregard it. The Trial Chamber rejected the argument with
the following statement:
This argument proceeds on the assumption that the evidence is complete. That as-
sumption is erroneous, as what Todorovic´ is seeking is further evidence from SFOR
which will assist him to obtain the relief which he seeks. Only when Todorovic´ has
had the opportunity to present all the available evidencewill it be possible for the Trial
Chamber to determine whether he is entitled to the relief he seeks.93
Despite representationsby theOTPandSFORthat the factswerenot indispute for
the purposes of themotions,94 it appears to have been obvious to the Trial Chamber
that theywere – if for no other reason than that all of the factswere not yet available
to all of the parties. Even if Todorovic´’s allegations were accepted ‘at their highest’
by the OTP and SFOR for the purposes of the motions – something which was by
no means clear95 – he was, nevertheless, not in a position to make fuller or further
90. See S. Lamb, ‘The Powers of Arrest of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, (1999)
70 BYIL 167, where the author, herself a Legal Advisor to the OTP, appears to view this approach as badly
flawed. She notes at 211: ‘Despite the expressed preference of the Prosecutor that close judicial scrutiny of
the facts surrounding arrests effected by multi-national forces be avoided, it would nevertheless be highly
undesirable for an ICTY Trial Chamber to abdicate its judicial function in this manner.’
91. In its pleadings, the OTP noted: ‘If the remedy is not available to the Accused, then there is no reason to
permit the discovery being sought by the Accused since it would amount to nothing more than a ‘fishing
expedition’ that could not under any circumstances, regardless of what information the Accused might obtain from
SFOR, lead to his release’ (emphasis added). See ProsecutionAppeal andApplication for Leave to Appeal, supra
note 26, at para. 20.
92. See note 48 and accompanying text, supra.
93. See Decision onMotion for Judicial Assistance of 18 Oct. 2000, supra note 6, at para. 59.
94. See supra note 88.
95. The OTP’s assertion that it was willing to assume Todorovic´’s allegations to be true, and to take them ‘at
their highest’ was quite misleading. Instead of taking his allegations at their highest, the OTP referred to
a carefully drawn list of facts that it was willing to admit for the purposes of the motions and made no
concessions additional to these (see supra note 88). Important omissions from the OTP’s list included the
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allegations without having the requested disclosure.Without the full story of what
happened surrounding his arrest (information presumably possessed by SFOR and
its contributing states, and, perhaps, theOTP), Todorovic´ was disadvantaged; hewas
only in a position tomake allegations relating to conduct ofwhichhe hadfirst-hand
knowledge. There was nothing to say that disclosure of the full story of his arrest
would not show treatment that was significantly worse than he had alleged.96 As
such, theTrial Chamber correctly observed that itwould only be appropriate to turn
to the issue of the suitability of the remedy where the evidence was complete.97
Despite the finding of the Trial Chamber that the evidencewas not complete and
despite its decision not to go on to examine the suitability of the remedies requested
byTodorovic´, theargumentsbytheOTPandSFOR98 inthis regardwarrantanalysis.99
In short, the OTP argued that Todorovic´’s request that his indictment be dismissed
andhe be released stemmed fromamisunderstanding of the law. Such a remedywas
only available in the most egregious situations and the conduct he alleged was not
sufficiently egregious.100 Using thehypothetical exampleof anaccused in anational
legal systemwho was charged with murder and had been illegally beaten by police
during arrest, the OTP argued that international norms do not necessarily require
that the prosecution be terminated in the face of illegal behaviour. Other remedies
may be appropriate and
Withdrawal of the indictment altogether would be required only in extreme cases,
where any continuation of the trial proceedings would in all the circumstances be
fundamentally incompatible with the right to a fair trial and the integrity of the
accused’s allegations of collusion between the OTP and SFOR, as well as allegations that the accused was
beaten by the forces that captured him. See Prosecution Response of 22 Feb. 1999, supra note 70, at paras.
24–26.
96. Itmight, for example, have come to light upon full disclosure of the facts that therewas an extremedisregard
ofnationalor international lawbySFORofanevenmoreegregiousnature than that allegedby theaccused, or
that there had been collusion between theOTP and SFOR.Althoughnotmade explicit in theTrial Chamber’s
reasons, insight into the thinking of the judges may perhaps be found in the following passage from the
Transcript of the Trial Chamber hearing of 4March 1999, at 363–4 (as relied upon in Lamb, supra note 90, at
211, n. 156):
the case law establishes that in order for the Tribunal to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction, it must
be shown that the illegalities taint [ . . .] the whole justice system, but [that has to be established and]
isn’t that the purpose of the evidentiary hearing?Wouldn’t the evidentiary hearing, if granted, assist
in showing whether there was any connection between the [Office of the Prosecutor] and the alleged
abduction?
97. This was particularly so given that at the core of the OTP’s argument on the issue of the availability of the
remedywas the assertion that the treatment of Todorovic´ was not sufficiently egregious to justify the requested relief;
see notes 100–02 and accompanying text, infra.
98. Because the bulk of the arguments on the issues relating to remedy come from theOTP, this analysis follows
its approach more closely than that of SFOR. Nevertheless, many aspects of the arguments of the OTP and
SFOR are identical. Similar arguments were also raised by the United States, in its requests for a review of
the 18 Oct. 2000 Decision; see notes 57 and 58 and accompanying text, supra.
99. In part due to the fact that in the Nikolic´ case (see supra note 16) the OTP has raised them once again in
response to an accused’s argument of illegal capture; see notes 172–85 and accompanying text, infra.
100. See Prosecution Response of 22 Feb. 1999, supra note 70, at para. 27, where the OTP observed: ‘The accused’s
Motion appears to proceed from the assumption that if there is any breach of the fundamental rights of an
accused in the criminal justice process, the accused will be entitled to have the indictment dismissed and to
be released. This is clearly not the case. In many cases, where there is a violation of the rights of an accused,
other remedies may be available to cure any resulting injustice.’
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justice system. In each case it is therefore necessary to identify exactly which rights of
the accused are said to have been violated.101
To theOTPthe ‘question, then, iswhether such illegalities in theaccused’s forcible
removal from the FRY would require that the indictment against the accused be
dismissed, and that the accused be released from custody’.102
In order to answer its question, the OTP directed the Trial Chamber to the ju-
risprudence of various national courts in cases of illegal interstate capture – that
is, cases where an accused was brought before a court in state A after having been
captured in state B by the authorities of state A in amanner that was in violation of
state B’s laws and its sovereignty in international law.
Approaches to exercising jurisdiction over a defendant brought before a national court
by illegal inter-state capture. As is well known, two approaches exist in national
jurisprudence on the question of whether illegal capture in one state affects the
ability of the other state properly to exercise its jurisdiction over an accused.103
According to one school of thought, it is perfectly proper for a national court to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over a defendant who has been illegally captured
from another state in violation of the sovereignty of that other state. In support
of this approach the OTP relied primarily on the cases of Eichmann104 and Alvarez-
Machain.105 In the words of the Israeli Supreme Court in Eichmann,
It is an established rule of law that a person standing trial for an offence against the
laws of the land may not oppose his being tried by reason of the illegality of his arrest
or of the means whereby he was brought to the area of jurisdiction of the country.106
This approach may be summarized in the Latin maxim male captus bene detentus
(that is, a person improperly seized may nevertheless be properly detained), the
international precedent for which is said to go back to the Eichmann case.107 After
the abduction of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann from Argentina, the UN
Security Council adopted a resolution finding Argentina’s sovereignty to have been
101. Ibid., at para. 28 (emphasis inoriginal).Anargument that inorder todetermine the suitability of the accused’s
proposed remedy thepotential fairnessof the trialmustbeconsidered ‘inall the circumstances’withacareful
examination of ‘exactly which rights of the accused are said to have been violated’, is not easily reconciled
with the OTP’s earlier argument that disclosure from SFOR on the facts surrounding Todorovic´’s arrest was
unnecessary, as the matter could be decided on the limited facts available.
102. Ibid., at para. 30. As noted by the OTP, this is the very question left open in the Dokmanovic´ case, see
section 2, supra.
103. A thorough analysis of the different approaches of state courts to illegal inter-state capture is beyond the
scope of this discussion. For a good overview of the different approaches to the question of how national
courts act in the face of an illegal abduction of an accused, see Lamb, supra note 90, 228 et seq.
104. The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann (Israel, District Court 1961, Supreme Court 1962),
(1961) 36 ILR 5, at 57–76, 304–308; reproduced in part in C. Oliver, ‘TheAttorney-General of theGovernment
of Israel v. Eichmann’, (1962) 56 AJIL 805.
105. United States v. Alvarez-Machain (USA, United States Supreme Court), 504 US 655 (1992). In addition, the
OTP relied on ‘references given in Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. I (9th edn, Jennings and Watts (eds.),
1992), 389 n. 16 [as well as] Karlshruher Kommentar zur Strafprozeßordnung (3rd edn, Pfeiffer (ed.), 1993 at 68’
in support of this approach. See Prosecution Response of 22 Feb. 1999, supra note 70, at para. 31, n. 9.
106. See Oliver, supra note 104, at 835.
107. SeeM. Scharf, ‘The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice in the NewMillennium: Lessons from
the Yugoslavia Tribunal’, (2000) 49DePaul Law Review 925, at 968.
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affected and calling for reparations,108 but not requiring his return. As noted by
Scharf, ‘Eichmannwas subsequently tried, convicted, and executed in Israelwithout
further objection by the international community.’109
Amore recent exampleof themale captus bene detentusapproachwas theUScaseof
Alvarez-Machain.110 Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national, was abducted
from Mexico by US officials and taken forcibly to the United States to stand trial
for kidnapping and murder. His abduction took place without the permission of
the Mexican government and without regard to an existing extradition treaty. A
majority of the US Supreme Court held that his abduction did not prohibit his trial
in the United States and confirmed the existing rule that ‘the power of a court to
try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within
the court’s jurisdiction by reason of a “forcible abduction”’.111 While conceding that
the abduction ‘may be in violation of general international law principles’,112 the
majority of the Supreme Court held that it was not in violation of the extradition
treaty between theUnited States andMexico.113 The decision generated criticism in
theUnited States, condemnationby theUNWorkingGrouponArbitraryDetention,
and widespread outrage in the international community.114
The other approach to illegal inter-state capture in national jurisprudence takes
the opposite view: if an individual is brought before a court by means of an illegal
arrest, it is appropriate for that court tomakeadeterminationas towhether it should
refuse to exercise jurisdiction.115 The reasoning of this approach is well represented
108. Security Council Res. 196, UNDoc. S/4349 (1960).
109. See Scharf, supra note 107, at 968.
110. SeeUnited States v. Alvarez-Machain, supra note 105.
111. Ibid., at 661, where the Supreme Court cites favourably the case of Frisbie v. Collins, 342 US 519, 72 S Ct 509
(1952), rehearing denied, 343 US 937, 72 S Ct 768 (1952) where the quoted passage appeared at 552 (US) and
511 (S Ct).
112. Ibid., at 669.
113. Remarkably, theSupremeCourt reasoned that theExtraditionTreatywasnotviolatedas itmadenoprovision
prohibiting its circumvention: ‘the language of the Treaty, in the context of its history, does not support the
proposition that the Treaty prohibits abductions outside its terms’ (ibid., at 666).
114. See Scharf, supra note 107, at 969, where Scharf notes that the UNWorking Group on Arbitrary Detention
specifically condemned the detention ofAlvarez-Machain as being in violation ofArt. 9 of the ICCPR.He also
points out that in the aftermath of Alvarez-Machain, a resolution was sponsored at the General Assembly
calling for an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the extraterritorial exercise of coercive power. See also
C.Biblowit, ‘TransborderAbductionsandUnitedStatesPolicy:CommentsonUnitedStates v.AlvarezMachain’,
(1996) 9New York International Law Review 105, at 107, where he observed:
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, described the decision as ‘monstrous’. The New York Times
foundthemajority’sopinion ‘astonishing’.The Inter-American JuridicalCommitteeof theOrganization
of American States criticised the decision; Mexico, and many other countries protested. Rarely has a
decision of the Supreme Court on an issue of international law created as great a furor.
115. The following examples of national court cases advocating this approach were relied upon by the OTP (see
Prosecution Response of 22 Feb. 1999, supra note 70, at para. 33, n. 13):
R. v.Hartley (NewZealand,Court ofAppeal) [1978] 2NZLR199, 77 ILR330;State v. Ebrahim (SouthAfrica,
Supreme Court (Appellate Division)) 1991 (2) SA 553, 95 ILR 417; R v. Horseferry RoadMagistrates’ Court,
ex parte Bennett (England, House of Lords) [1994] 1 AC 42, 95 ILR 380. See also United States v. Toscanino
(USA, US Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit) 500 F 2d 267 (1974); Stocke´ v. Federal Republic of Germany
(European Commission of Human Rights, 12 Oct. 1989) 95 ILR 328, 332–3; Garcı´a v. Ecuador (Human
Rights Committee), Comm. No. 319/1988, UN Doc. A/47/40 (1994), pp. 287–90; Celiberti de Casariego v.
Uruguay (Human Rights Committee), Comm. No. 56/1979, Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1, pp. 92–94.
See also Lamb, supra note 90, 228, n. 222.
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by the British case of Bennett,116 which involved a citizen of New Zealand who was
alleged to have committed criminal offences in the United Kingdom. He had been
traced to South Africa, a country to which the UK Extradition Act (1989) applied,
providingaprocess tobringhimbeforeBritishcourts. Thisprocesswasnot followed;
rather he was abducted from South Africa – the result, he claimed, of collusion
between the SouthAfrican and British police – and brought to England for trial. The
case considered the two approaches to illegal inter-state capture in the context of
both the British law and the law of other states,117 and rejected themale captus bene
detentus approach. Amajority of theHouse of Lords found that courts had the power
to refuse to try a case ‘upon the grounds that it would be an abuse of process to do
so’.118 It concluded that courts possess the ‘power to inquire into the circumstances
by which a person has been brought within the jurisdiction and if satisfied that it
was in disregard of extradition procedures itmay stay the prosecution and order the
release of the accused’.119 Were the court to have found otherwise, it would have
allowed the executive authority to take advantage of its illegal activity.120
In its pleadings, the OTP led by arguing in favour of themale captus bene detentus
principle. It noted that the practice of exercising criminal jurisdiction over a defen-
dant who had been forcibly abducted from another state in violation of that state’s
sovereignty had some support in national jurisprudence.121 Moreover, it noted that
‘Doctrinal support can also be found for the view that the exercise of criminal ju-
risdiction in such circumstances is not in itself contrary to international law’.122
However, despite this ostensible confidence in themale captus bene detentus principle
in international law, the OTP carefully avoided going down a path that would have
required it to champion the principle.123
Instead it rapidly moved to safer ground. Without conceding that a male captus
bene detentus approach was untenable before the ICTY,124 the OTP advised the Trial
116. Bennett, ibid.
117. In particular, the court relied on Ebrahim and Hartley (supra note 115) in reaching its decision.
118. Bennett, supra note 115, at 62 (AC).
119. Ibid., at 64 (AC). Although this case involved the circumvention of an extradition procedure, nothing in the
reasoning of the House of Lords would indicate that a court’s power to stay the prosecution in the face of an
abuse of process was limited to such circumstances. The court expresses no opinion on cases not involving
situations where extradition is unavailable. For more on the question of whether an extradition procedure
is essential to the reasoning of the court, see notes 128–36 and accompanying text, infra.
120. Lord Griffiths stressed that while the courts ‘of course, have no power to apply direct discipline to the police
or the prosecuting authorities, . . . they can refuse to allow them to take advantage of abuse of power by
regarding their behaviour as an abuse of process and thus preventing a prosecution’. Bennett, supranote 115,
at 62 (AC).
121. See Prosecution Response of 22 Feb. 1999, supra note 70, at para. 31, n. 9, where the OTP relies on Eichmann,
supra note 104, and Alvarez-Machain, supra note 105.
122. Ibid., at para. 31; seealso n. 10, where the OTP relied, inter alia, on I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International
Law (5th edn, 1998), 320, andM. Shaw, International Law (4th edn, 1997), at 478.
123. Given the widespread condemnation of the principle in international law and the furore surrounding the
case of Alvarez-Machain (see notes 110–14 and accompanying text, supra), this was undoubtedly a wise
move.
124. Although, later, in its appeal of the 18 Oct. 2000 Decision requiring assistance from SFOR (see Prosecution
Appeal and Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 26, at para. 17), the OTP appears to move away from
themale captus bene detentus approach, conceding that it is appropriate in some cases for the Trial Chamber
to look at the circumstances surrounding the arrest.
The Prosecution . . . notes the concern expressed by Judge Robinson regarding the accountability and
control of arresting forces in the field and acknowledges there may be some circumstances in which a Trial
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Chamber that itwould not be relying on the principle as it did not need to do so.125 It
argued that the requested remedywould be equally inappropriatewhether the Trial
Chamber accepted the male captus bene detentus approach or rejected it in favour
of the approach of national courts which have held ‘that a court should decline
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over an accused who has been brought within the
jurisdictionof the court bymeansof an irregular rendition’.126 Thiswas so, it argued,
because ‘the basis of the reasoning in these [latter] cases affords no valid analogy to
the situation under consideration by this Trial Chamber in the present case’.127 The
OTP offered three reasons for this assertion:
1 in Todorovic´’s case there was no violation of an extradition treaty;
2 Todorovic´’s illegal capture was not undertaken by agents of the prosecuting
state or organization; and
3 there was no violation of Todorovic´’s right to liberty and security of person.
Each reason will be briefly considered below.
Absence of an extradition treaty. It was argued by the OTP that some of the national
court decisions refusing jurisdiction ‘were premised on the fact that the removal of
the accused from the other State involved a circumvention of applicable extradition
procedures’.128 It then noted the absence of extradition procedures in the Todorovic´
case.Withoutexplicitlyhavingsaidso, theimplicationoftheOTPappearedtobethat
the existenceof anextraditionarrangement– and its circumvention–was somehow
essential to the decisions of the national courts to refuse to exercise jurisdiction; as
there was no circumvention of any such agreement with Todorovic´, the authorities
did not apply.
This argument ismisleading. It is uncontroversial that ‘the transfer of an accused
to the Tribunal by a State authority is not a matter of extradition’.129 It is equally
true to point out, as the OTP did, that ‘the transfer of the accused to the Tribunal
therefore cannot have constituted a breach of any rights under any extradition
arrangement’.130 However, while the reasoning in several of the cases cited was
Chamber may legitimately wish to exercise a supervisory role over the conduct of arrests in the field . . . There
may . . . be exceptional cases in which the manner in which an Accused is brought before the Tribunal
is so egregious and so shocking to the conscience that it would bring the judicial process into disrepute
were a Court to exercise its (otherwise valid) personal jurisdiction over him. (Emphasis added.)
125. See Prosecution Response of 22 Feb. 1999, supra note 70, at paras. 31 and 33. This approachwas also taken by
SFOR (see Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance of 18 Oct. 2000, supra note 6, at para. 19) and later by
the United States in the brief it filed to the Appeals Chamber on 15 Nov. 2000 (see Murphy, supra note 58, at
403, for a discussion of the US position.)
126. See Prosecution Response of 22 Feb. 1999, supra note 70, at para. 33.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid., at para. 34. Virtually identical language is used by Lamb, supra note 90, at 232, where she discusses
application of the national case law to the Todorovic´ case.
129. See Prosecution Response of 22 Feb. 1999, supra note 70, at para. 34 (emphasis in original). The OTP also
pointed out that certain principles of extradition law – including the principle of speciality, the political
offence exception and the need for the requested state to be satisfied that a prima facie case has been
established – did not apply (ibid., at para. 35). All of this is uncontroversial.
130. Ibid., at para. 35. As there are no extradition procedures in place between the FRY and the Tribunal – or
indeed between the Tribunal and any state – theremay of course be no claim that such procedures had been
breached.
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indeed based on the national court’s concern at the state’s ignoring an established
extradition regime (thereby depriving the accused of guarantees afforded by that
system),131 none of the courts held – or implied – that the existence of an extradition
treatywasasinequanonofthedeterminationtorefuse jurisdiction.132 Theargument
that national courts’ reasoning – reflecting as it does a desire to protect the accused
from illegal behaviour on the part of state agents,133 to prevent the abuse of the
process of the court,134 to safeguard the rule of law,135 and to protect an accused’s
freedom in society136 – was contingent on the existence of an extradition regime
was not convincingly made by the OTP.
Illegal capture not undertaken by agents of the Tribunal because SFOR, and not the
OTP, stands in the position of the state agents who performed the illegal capture. The OTP
stressedthatthenationalcaseswheretherewasarefusaltoexercise jurisdiction‘were
premised on the fact that the authorities of the forum State [that is, the prosecuting
state]were involved in the relevant illegality’.137 TheOTP argued that this reasoning
was inapplicable to the Todorovic´ case because the OTP ‘had no involvement in any
activity relating to the accused’s removal from the FRY’,138 it had not acted illegally,
and the conduct of SFOR – legal or otherwise – could not be imputed to it.139 While
it is indeed true that the participation of agents of the prosecuting state140 has been
an important factor in the reasoning of national courts,141 and while it is also true
that different considerations may apply when the illegal arrest is carried out by
individuals or authorities other than those representing the prosecuting state, this
would only be relevant if the absence of ICTY involvement were beyond doubt.
131. See, for example, Bennett, supra note 115, at 62 (AC), where Lord Griffiths stressed the importance of the
state not ‘flouting the extradition procedures and depriving the accused of the safeguards built into the
extradition process for his benefit’.
132. Indeed, in the Bennett case (ibid.), Lord Griffiths made it clear that he was unwilling to express any opinion
on a scenario where there was no extradition procedure available.
133. See supra note 120.
134. See Hartley, supra note 115, at 215–17; cited with approval by Lord Griffiths in Bennett (supra note 115, at 60
(AC)).
135. See Hartley, ibid., at 217, where the court held:
We are . . . satisfied that the means which were adopted to make that trial possible are so much at
variance with the statute, and so much in conflict with one of the most important principles of the
rule of law, that if application had been made . . . , the judge would probably have been justified in
exercising his discretion under [the statute] or under the inherent jurisdiction to direct that the accused
be discharged.
Relied on by Lord Griffiths in Bennett, supra at note 115, at 55 (AC).
136. ‘The issues raised by this affair are basic to the whole concept of freedom in society’ (see Hartley, ibid.); cited
with approval by Lord Griffiths in Bennett (ibid., at 54 (AC)).
137. See Prosecution Response of 22 Feb. 1999, supra note 70, at para. 36 (emphasis in original).
138. Ibid.
139. Both SFOR and the OTP relied on the decisions in Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, Decision, Case No. ICTR-
97-19-AR72, A. Ch., 3 Nov. 1999 and Decision (Prosecutor’s Request for Review and Reconsideration), Case
No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, A Ch, 31 March 2000, where it was held that the exceptional remedy of dismissal
and release was only appropriate where the misconduct was attributable to the conduct of the OTP. Since
here it was not, they argued, the remedy was unavailable and an order for disclosure from SFOR would be
unnecessary; see Prosecution Appeal and Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 26, at para. 14.
140. That is to say, enforcement officials from the same state where the case is being heard.
141. TheOTPrightlynotedthatoneof thepurposesofcourtshavingthediscretiontorefuse toexercise jurisdiction
when the authorities of that same state had acted illegally ‘is to impose a form of discipline and control over
the authorities of the forum State’ (see Prosecution Response of 22 Feb. 1999, supra note 70, at para. 37). See
also note 120 and accompanying text, supra.
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Here, however – even assuming that Todorovic´’s allegations of collusion between
the OTP and SFOR would have been proved to be unfounded upon full disclosure
of the facts142 – the divide between SFOR and the Tribunal does not appear to be as
great as the OTP and SFOR have represented it to be.
The OTP and SFOR placed great emphasis on their assertion that the OTP alone –
and not SFOR – was by analogy to represent the enforcement agents of the prose-
cuting state in the national cases, with SFOR being treated as analogous to a third
party.143 However, the nature of the relationship between SFOR and the OTP and,
more generally, between SFOR and the Tribunal as a whole, calls such an assertion
into question. If one is to analogize the circumstances of Todorovic´’s capture with
the law of interstate capture, it would surely bemore apt to liken SFOR to the role of
the enforcement agents of theprosecuting state.144 Theyhave, after all, been charged
with effecting arrests on behalf of the Tribunal.145 Such an approach is reflected in
Judge Robinson’s separate decision on theMotion for Judicial Assistance from SFOR
and others, where he likens the role of SFOR ‘to that of a police force in some do-
mestic legal systems’, and notes that ‘it virtually operates as an enforcement arm of
the Tribunal . . . ’.146 At a minimum, it would appear to be fitting to consider SFOR
to be a co-enforcement official, alongside the OTP, given that each has a role in the
execution of arrest warrants.147 A similar argument made by counsel for Todorovic´
was that SFOR was acting as an agent of the Tribunal, because it ratified SFOR’s
conduct in obtaining custody of Todorovic´ by proceedingwith the case.148 Of course
if SFORwere taken to be part of the ICTY’s enforcement apparatus or an agent of the
OTP, then the OTP’s argument fails and the national jurisprudence whereby courts
142. Todorovic´ hadmade repeated claims that the OTP was involved in his capture (see, e.g., Decision onMotion
for Evidentiary Hearing, supra note 28, at 2, and Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance of 18 Oct. 2000,
supra note 6, at para. 33). However, the OTP’s approach was to play down these allegations, at times denying
that they existed and, at times, conceding they did exist but denying their veracity. If, as the OTP claimed, it
had acceptedTodorovic´’s allegations ‘at their highest’ (see note 95 and accompanying text, supra), it is indeed
strange that it felt entitled to leave out his allegations against it in this regard.
143. ‘SFOR points out that, in the current case, it is the Office of the Prosecutor, not SFOR, that stands analogous
to the agents of a prosecuting State’. See Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance of 18 Oct. 2000, supra
note 6, at para. 19. Similarly, the United States, in its brief to the Appeals Chamber in this matter, considered
the national jurisprudence regarding cross-border abduction. It noted that ‘when agents of the prosecuting
State have not been shown to be complicit, there are no grounds for [discretion on the part of the state court
to decline jurisdiction over an individual captured in violation of another state’s law]. In the current case, the
OTP plays the same role as the agents of the prosecuting State, while SFOR and other entities and States have no such
role’ (emphasis added). (See Murphy, supra note 58, at 403.)
144. Todorovic´ makes this point when he challenges ‘SFOR’s assertion that it is the Office of the Prosecutor that
stands analogous to state officials, asserting instead that it is SFOR, acting pursuant to its mandate from
the Security Council of the United Nations, that stands in such a relationship’. See Decision on Motion for
Judicial Assistance of 18Oct. 2000, supranote 6, at para. 23 and n. 26, relying onDefence Reply to Submission
made by SFOR, filed 17 July 2000, at 2–3.
145. See Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance of 18 Oct. 2000, supra note 6, at paras. 43–45. For a detailed
discussion of the powers of arrest of the ICTY and the role of SFOR therein, see Lamb, supra note 90.
146. See Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson, supra note 79, at para. 6 and n. 2. He concludes: ‘It would be odd if
the Tribunal had no competence in relation to the exercise of certain aspects of this quasi-police function’
(ibid.).
147. See supra note 145.
148. Ibid., at 210, n. 153.
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refuse jurisdiction to discourage authorities of the prosecuting state from behaving
illegally becomes applicable.149
No violation of the accused’s right to liberty and security of person. A third rationale,
according to the OTP, for the refusal of jurisdiction over an accused whose presence
was secured by illegal interstate capture was a concern about the accused’s right
to liberty and security of person.150 This right is guaranteed by Article 9 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 5 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.151 The OTP argued that this rationale was
inapplicable in this case, and gave various reasons for its assertion.
First, the OTP noted that the right to liberty and security of person ‘requires that
“any measure depriving a person of his liberty must be in accordance with the do-
mestic law . . . where the deprivation of liberty takes place”’.152 It then discounted
this rationale on the basis that there ‘is no rule that a person indicted by theTribunal
can be arrested only pursuant to the national law of the place where the person is
located’.153 Of course it is true that the ICTY is not limited in its functioning by the
national laws of the states in which it acts – otherwise any non-co-operative state
could legislate at any time to prevent its functioning in that state. But if the OTP is
to look to jurisprudence setting out the right to liberty and security at the national
level and distil the requirement that the deprivation of liberty must comport with
the procedural guarantees where this deprivation takes place, surely the apposite
question for the Trial Chamber is whether Todorovic´ had been afforded his pro-
cedural rights under the international law governing the functioning of the ICTY,
not whether he had been afforded his procedural rights under the law of the FRY.
Second, while conceding that ‘Tribunal indictees do enjoy the right to liberty and
security of person under international law’,154 the OTP argued that in Todorovic´’s
case this right had been met. However, the OTP appeared to favour an extremely
limited interpretation of the right. It noted that ‘such rights are not violated where
persons validly indicted for serious violations of internationalhumanitarian laware
apprehended inorder that theybe taken intocustody to face trial onsuchcharges’.155
It described issues relating to the procedure surrounding the arrest warrant156 –
including the fact that it had not been issued to the states involved in the
149. It also becomes very relevant indeed for the defendant to know what SFOR knew, how it acted, whether it
paid anyone to carry out its deeds and who its co-conspirators might have been.
150. Here the OTP referred to the cases of Garcı´a and Celiberti de Casariego, supra note 115.
151. Art. 9(1) of the ICCPR provides that ‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by
law.’ Art. 5(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
provides that ‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
save . . . in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.’
152. See Prosecution Response of 22 Feb. 1999, supra note 70, at para. 40, where the OTP relies upon the Stocke´
case, supra note 115.
153. Ibid., at para. 41.
154. See Prosecution Appeal and Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 26, at para. 15.
155. Ibid.
156. The only arrest warrant relating to Todorovic´ had been directed to the two governing authorities in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina-Sarajevo and the Bosnian Serb Administration-Pale)
with copies of the arrest warrant having been transmitted to IFOR, SFOR’s predecessor. See Prosecution
Response of 22 Feb. 1999, supra note 70, at paras. 25 and 41.
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detention and had not specifically authorized an arrest in the country to which
the accused had fled – as ‘immaterial’,157 and appeared content to overlookwhether
excessive force had been used. In short, the OTP appeared to be asserting that
neither the particulars of the arrest warrant nor the nature of the apprehension
were relevant to the issue of the right to liberty and security – so long as the
indictment was valid. Consideration of the right to liberty and security of per-
son by international bodies both at the European level158 and the wider interna-
tional level159 suggests that the OTP’s approach may be overly deferential to the
Tribunal.
A final element of the OTP’s argument against a violation of Todorovic´’s right to
liberty and security considers theviolationof theFRY’s sovereignty. For thepurposes
of the motions, the OTP conceded that the FRY’s sovereignty had been violated;160
however, it asserted that
even if the forcible removal of the accused from the FRY as part of his transfer to the
Tribunal violated rights of the FRY under international law, it cannot be said to have
violated any right of the accused to liberty or security of person.161
157. The OTP argued (ibid., at para. 43):
It is immaterial whether or not an arrest warrant had been issued to the particular State or Stateswhose
authoritiesmay have been involved in the accused’s detention and transfer to the Tribunal, or whether
any such warrant expressly extended to authorizing an arrest in the territory of the FRY. A State does
not require an arrest warrant specifically addressed to that State in order to lawfully detain an accused
for transfer to the Tribunal.
158. See, for example, the discussion of the right to liberty and security of the person under Art. 5(1) of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (see supra note 151,
for the text of this provision) in F. Jacobs and R. White, The European Convention on Human Rights (1996), 80,
where it is observed: ‘Where, for example, a warrant is required for arrest, thewarrantmust be in the correct
form. Otherwise the arrest will not be lawful under Article 5. Similarly, where force is used in order to effect
an arrest, the degree of force used must not exceed that authorized in the circumstances by domestic law.’
See also Bozano v. France, Judgment of 18 Nov. 1986, 1989 ECHR (Ser. A) No. 111, where the court considered
the case of an Italian national who had been convicted in Italy and had taken refuge in France. Although
the French judicial authorities were unwilling to extradite him to Italy, he was taken against his will to
Switzerland, which was willing to extradite him to Italy. The European Court of Human Rights found the
detention to be unlawful as it was not in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law. Cf. the discussion
of the right in R. Reed and J.Murdoch,AGuide to Human Rights Law in Scotland (2001), 209, where the authors
consider the Commission’s determination that the forcible abduction of ‘Carlos the Jackal’ from Sudan and
his transfer to France did not raise any Art. 5 issue (Sa´nchez-Ramires v. France, Decision of 24 June 1996, 1996
DR 86, at 155). However, the authors describe the Commission’s reasoning as ‘unconvincing’ and in sharp
contrast to the Court’s approach in cases like Bozano. (See also the cases and authorities relied upon by the
authors, at 211, n. 18.)
159. Regarding the right to liberty and security of person under Art. 9(1) of the ICCPR (see supra note 151,
for the text of this provision) the cases of Garcı´a and Celiberti de Casariego (see supra note 115), while
thin on reasoning, indicate that illegal interstate capture may well be a violation of the right not to be
deprived of one’s liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established
by law.
160. For the purposes of the motions only, the OTP conceded that the forcible removal from the FRY without
the consent of the national authorities constituted a violation of the sovereignty of that country under
international law. See Prosecution Response of 22 Feb. 1999, supra note 70, at para. 25.
161. Ibid., at para. 48 (emphasis in original). See also ibid., at para. 32, where the OTP stated: ‘A violation of State
sovereignty is a violation of the rights of the relevant State, which is a third party to the proceeding, and an
accused cannot normally invoke a remedy in respect of breaches of rights of third parties. To be entitled to a
remedy, the accusedwould need to establish that this violation of a State’s sovereignty also constituted some
violation of the accused’s own rights.’
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This argument would appear to be an amalgam of the question of whether an
individual may claim a remedy for a breach of his or her state’s sovereignty162 with
the quite separate question of whether an individual may claim a remedy for a
breach of his or her right to liberty and security of person.
3.2.5. No unlawful breach of the FRY’s state sovereignty
Afinalargument–that, in the lightof theTribunal’suniqueposition,measures taken
by it in the FRY relating toTodorovic´’s arrest did not violate that state’s sovereignty –
was onlymade latterly by the OTP and was not considered by the Trial Chamber.163
Somewhat confusingly, this argument appears to contradict earlier arguments of
theOTPwhichwere premised on the assertion that, for the purposes of themotions,
it waswilling to concede that the sovereignty of the FRY had been violated.164 More-
over, the argument would appear to be at variance with the OTP’s earlier assertion
that the activity surrounding Todorovic´’s arrest could in noway be attributed to the
Tribunal.165 At the heart of this argument is the assertion that because the ICTY is
a creation of the UN Security Council under Chapter VII, the ICTY is subject to a
specific exception to theCharter’s prohibitionon interference indomestic affairs.166
The OTP argued that the powers of the ICTY ‘in the legitimate performance of its
functions . . . prevail over traditional concerns of state sovereignty’.167 As such, ‘mea-
sures taken by this Tribunal under Chapter VII, which would otherwise constitute
an illegal breach of the sovereignty of a state, are lawful.’168 If it were otherwise,
the OTP argued, thenmuch of the functioning of the Tribunal would result in such
breaches of sovereignty.169
All of this is uncontroversial enough: different considerations regarding state
sovereigntymust surely applywhen a sub-organ of the SecurityCouncil established
162. See Prosecutor v. Dusan Tadic´, Decision on the DefenceMotion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case
No. IT-94-1, AC, 2 Oct. 1995, at para. 55 et seq., where the Appeals Chamber held that individuals may invoke
breaches of state sovereignty before the Tribunal in their own right.
163. It was elaborated in the Prosecution Response toMotions for Judicial Assistance, supra note 26.
164. See note 161 and accompanying text, supra.
165. Surely an argument by the OTP that Todorovic´’s arrest was not an illegal breach of the FRY’s sovereignty
because the ICTY was, by virtue of its creation under Chapter VII, the beneficiary of a specific exception
under Art. 2(7), must be a tacit admission by the OTP that the conduct of the SFOR and/or others in effecting
his arrest was Tribunal conduct. Of course such a concession would be entirely at variance with its earlier
position. Seenotes 137–50 and accompanying text, supra.
166. Art. 2(7) of the United Nations Charter provides: ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
State or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII’ (emphasis added).
167. SeeProsecutionResponse toMotions for JudicialAssistance, supranote26, atpara. 13,where theOTPreliedon
the decision inBlasˇkic´, supranote 75, for authority. ‘Theprinciples barring encroachments upon sovereignty,
which form the basis of the complaint raised by the defence, do not occur within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal’ (ibid., at para. 21). The OTP also argued in this regard that ‘some international laws are not binding
on certain international institutions, such as this Tribunal, because some international laws are exclusively
designed to regulate conduct between states and have no application to international institutions’. Ibid., at
para. 13 (emphasis in original).
168. See Prosecution Response toMotions for Judicial Assistance, supranote 26, at para. 21 (emphasis in original).
169. TheOTP noted that if the normal rules of non-interferencewith domestic jurisdiction of states applied, then
the Tribunal’s actions under Art. 1 (which deals with the ICTY’s power to prosecute), Art. 7(2) (jurisdiction
over sovereign heads of state), or Art. 9(2) (the ICTY’s primacy over national courts) of its Statute would all
result in breaches of the sovereignty of the FRY (ibid., at paras. 15–22).
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as a Chapter VII enforcement measure is carrying out its legitimate functions.
However, it would appear that the question that needs to be decided in this case is
not whether the powers of the ICTY in exercising its legitimate functions prevail over
traditional concerns of state sovereignty, but whether the ICTY is indeed exercising
its legitimate functions. The sovereignty of the FRYmust surely only take a back seat
to ICTY action pursuant to a Security Council decision under Chapter VII where
the ICTY is acting within the mandate bestowed upon it by the Security Council.
Therefore the more appropriate question might be: was the capture of Todorovic´ a
legitimate function of the ICTY – even if the accused’s fundamental human rights
were violated?170
In sum, several of the arguments of the OTP were ill-conceived. The argument
that Todorovic´ was not entitled to have access to information relating to his arrest
seems particularly flawed. However, the OTP’s decision to proceed with such an
approachwould appear to have beenmotivated by the hope that the Trial Chamber
would have accepted a weak argument in order to prevent alienating SFOR and its
powerfulparticipating states.A less independentTrialChambermighthavedone so.
By taking an approach that there could be no compromise on the issue of disclosure,
the SFOR added to its own difficulties by forcing the Trial Chamber’s hand. While
the OTP’s approach to the issue of the appropriateness of the requested remedy
in the face of illegal capture was problematic in many of its aspects, the issue of
how the Trial Chamber should deal with an accused brought before the Tribunal in
a similar way remains to be decided. And this is one of the key issues in the Nikolic´
case, currently before the ICTY.
4. NIKOLIC´ : TODOROVIC´ REVISITED
Dragan Nikolic´’s allegations of illegal capture have a familiar ring. Nikolic´ was in-
dicted on 4November 1994 for crimes againstMuslim and other non-Serb detainees
at the Susica camp.171 Orders for his arrest were issued on the same day, but he
remained at large until 21 April 2000.172 He alleges that sometime shortly before
21 April he was abducted in Serbia bymenwho falsely claimed to be police officers,
forced into the boot of a car, driven to the border with Bosnia, smuggled across the
Drina river by boat, and then handed over to US SFOR soldiers.173 His captors were
170. If therewere tobeafindingthat thecapturewas inconformitywith themandateof the ICTYnotwithstanding
violations of Todorovic´’s human rights under international norms, then difficult constitutional questions
on possible limitations upon the Security Council’s powers would need to be examined.
171. He was charged with eight counts of crimes against humanity stemming from his alleged involvement in
ethnic cleansing and his alleged position as commander of the Susica detention camp. The campwas said to
be overcrowded and the detainees were not provided with adequate food or other facilities. Moreover, it is
alleged that the detainees were beaten on a regular basis – sometimes to death. Rape and sexual assault are
also alleged. (See Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic´, Second Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, T. Ch. II, 7 Jan.
2002).
172. See Prosecutor’s Response to ‘Defence Motion for Relief based Inter Alia Upon Illegality of Arrest following
upon the Prior Unlawful Kidnapping and Imprisonment of the Accused and Co-related Abuse of Process
within the Contemplation of Discretionary Jurisdictional Relief under Rule 72’ filed 17 May 2001, filed
31May 2001, at paras. 4 and 5.
173. Z. Cvijanovic andV. Zimonjic, ‘Belgrade Crackdown: “Bounty hunters strike inside Serbia to seizewar crimes
suspects”’, Independent, 18 May 2000, at 14.
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subsequently convicted by a Serbian court for offences relating to the capture174
and, according to some reports, found to have been acting in return for payment
of £31,000.175 Nikolic´ was transferred to the ICTY on 22 April 2000. At his initial
appearance on 28 April, he pleaded not guilty on all counts.176
On 17 May 2002, Nikolic´ brought a motion before the ICTY on the basis of the
nature of his capture, requesting that the indictment against him be dismissed and
thathebeimmediatelyreturnedtotheFRY.177Hedescribedhiscaptureas ‘pernicious’
and argued that ‘a judicial body set up with . . . the objectives of preserving human
rights can have no proper option but to make it plain that jurisdiction will not be
entertained in such circumstances’.178 Nikolic´ alleged that his apprehension was
in violation of the national sovereignty of the FRY and contrary to international
human rights norms. Moreover, he argued that these breaches of international and
national law resulted in an abuse of process.179
Given that the Trial Chamber’s decision that Todorovic´ was entitled to disclosure
fromSFOR and its participating stateswas the ace in the hole that resulted in his ne-
gotiatinga favourablepleaagreementwith theOTP, itmighthavebeenexpected that
Nikolic´ would follow a similar path and seek potentially embarrassing disclosure
from SFOR and its participating states. Surprisingly, he did not. Instead, his counsel
requested that the Trial Chamber determine the jurisdictional consequences that
would flow from a successful challenge to the legality of the arrest as a preliminary
matter.180 Of course the OTP, which along with SFOR had been agitating for this
approach in the Todorovic´ case, was only too pleased to follow this course.181 Under
174. According to reports relied upon by the OTP itself, on 24 Nov. 2000, sevenmenwere convicted of offences in
relation to Nikolic´’s transfer to Bosnia andHerzegovina by the District Court in Smederevo. See Prosecution
Response to Defence Motion of 17 May 2001, supra note 172, at para. 5, citing Agence France-Presse, ‘Seven
Jailed by Yugoslav Court for AbductingWar Crimes Suspect’, 24 Nov. 2000.
175. See Cvijanovic and Zimonjic, supranote 173. The report indicates that the police said that the payment came
from ‘unspecified “foreign services”’.
176. He latermade a further initial appearance on18March2002 toplead to a second amended indictment,which
was confirmed on 15 Feb. 2002.
177. MotionforReliefBasedInterAliaUponIllegalityofArrest followinguponthePriorUnlawfulKidnappingand
Imprisonment of the Accused and Co-related Abuse of Process within the Contemplation of Discretionary
Jurisdictional Relief under Rule 72, 17May 2001.
178. See Prosecution Response to Defence Motion of 17 May 2001, supra note 172, at para. 7, relying on Motion
for Relief based Inter Alia Upon Illegality of Arrest following upon the Prior Unlawful Kidnapping and
Imprisonment of the Accused and Co-related Abuse of Process within the Contemplation of Discretionary
Jurisdictional Relief under Rule 72, 17May 2001, at para. 1.
179. Ibid., at paras. 7–10.
180. An agreement was reached between the parties to submit the following questions to the Trial Chamber for
resolution:
1. If it can be established by the accused that the accused’s arrest was achieved by any illegal conduct
committed by, or with the material complicity of: (a) any individual or organization (other than SFOR,
the OTP or the Tribunal); (b) SFOR; (c) the OTP; or (d) the Tribunal, would the accused be entitled to the
relief sought?
2. Does SFOR act as an agent of the OTP and/or the Tribunal in the detention and arrest of suspected
persons?
See Prosecutor’s Response to Defence ‘Motion to Determine Issues as Agreed Between the Parties and the
Trial Chamber . . . and the Consequences of any Illegal Conduct Material to the Accused, his Arrest and
Subsequent Detention’, Filed 29 Oct. 2001, filed 12 Nov. 2001, at para. 2.
181. In an apparent expression of its dissatisfaction with the approach of the Trial Chamber in the Todorovic´
case, the OTP endorsed the approach proposed by Nikolic´’s counsel, noting that ‘the determination of the
availability or otherwise of remedies ought to be viewed not as a matter which follows exhaustive attempts
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this approach, SFOR and its contributing states are safely out of reach of any em-
barrassing requests for disclosure from the Tribunal – at least until the complicated
issues related to remedy are considered. Presumably, if the Trial Chamber finds that
the requested remedy is inappropriate, Nikolic´ will request the Tribunal – which
by then may very well be losing patience with the matter – for an order requiring
disclosure from SFOR;182 if the remedy is found to be appropriate, the OTP still has
the option of making a deal with Nikolic´.
When this motion comes before the Trial Chamber, many of the arguments will
echo those made in the Todorovic´ case. It is already clear, based on the briefs filed
in support of the motion, that the OTP will again rely on municipal law analogies
involving irregularities in themeans by which accused are brought before national
courts. Once again there are assertions by the defence that his right to liberty and
security of person was violated. And once again the OTP argues that even assuming
thatviolationsof international lawcouldbeshowntohaveoccurredinthemannerof
theaccused’sarrest, theremediessoughtwere inappropriate inthecircumstances.183
Given that, as of the date of writing, the motion has not been decided, theNikolic´
case, as yet, does little to clarify the law on illegal capture. However, absent a last-
minute settlement, it would appear that the Trial Chamber, and perhaps ultimately
the Appeals Chamber, is likely to address and clarify the issues relating to illegal
capture and the appropriate remedies associated therewith. Other indictees who
have been brought before the Tribunal by SFOR184 will, no doubt, bewatching these
developments very closely indeed.
5. APPLICATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
With the entry into force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court185
and the establishment of the ICC,186 the difficulties of enforcement of international
criminal law will come into sharper relief. How will this nascent court with its
at evidence-gathering but rather, as a necessary preliminary to such measures. This consideration, it is
submitted, is particularly pertinent where the evidence-gathering exercise in question may impinge upon
the vital national security interests of third States and/or multinational forces in the field. See Prosecution
Response to DefenceMotion of 17May 2001, supra note 172, at para. 11.
182. Both Nikolic´’s counsel and the OTP stipulated that the Trial Chamber’s determination of the jurisdictional
consequences of a successful challenge to the arrest be on awithout prejudice basiswith regard to any future
position it may decide to adopt on the question of disclosure, thereby allowing Nikolic´ to seek disclosure
from SFOR and NATO at a later date if necessary.
183. Relying on the article by Lamb, supra note 90, the OTP argued that for the release of the accused to be an
appropriate remedy there would need to be, at a minimum, either: (1) ‘unambiguous, conscious violations
of international legality which can be attributed to the Office of the Prosecutor’; and/or (2) ‘violations . . .
of such egregiousness or outrageousness that, irrespective of any lack of involvement on the part of the
prosecution, the Trial Chamber could not, in good conscience, continue to exercise jurisdiction over the
accused’. TheOTPargues that itwasnot involved and that the alleged conductwasnot sufficiently egregious.
SeeProsecutor’s Response to DefenceMotion for Relief, supra note 174, at paras. 31–49.Cf. similar arguments
in the Todorovic´ case, supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
184. For a list of accused who have been brought before the ICTY through the intervention of SFOR, see Lamb,
supra note 90, 167, n. 3.
185. Adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court on 17 July 1998.
186. On 11 April 2002 the 60th instrument of ratification was deposited with the United Nations and, according
to Art. 126 of the Statute, the Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002.
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seat in the Netherlands be able to mete out justice when those it will be seeking to
prosecute are scattered about the globe?Will it ever be appropriate for force to be
used in a member state which has failed to uphold its obligations in international
law to surrender an accused?
The guidance provided by the Todorovic´ case and the other jurisprudence of the
ICTY is limited. This is so for at least two reasons. First, as discussed, the trinity of
cases thathas emerged relating to illegal captureoffers littleprecedential value:with
theDokmanovic´ case, the Tribunal found the capture not to be illegal; withTodorovic´,
the issues of illegal capture and SFOR’s possible involvement were forever buried
in the 28 November 2000 Plea Agreement; andwithNikolic´, the issues remain under
considerationby theTribunal. Second, itmust be recalled that the jurisdiction of the
ICTY arose through Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, an enviable genesis
not shared by the ICC. As such, under the ICC Statute only states parties have an
obligation to co-operate, andeven then it is anobligationwith certain limitations.187
With the ICTY, on the other hand, states are obliged to surrender an accused by virtue
of a binding Security Council resolution.188
Despite its incomplete nature, the jurisprudence of the ICTY on the issue of il-
legal capture does illustrate one important point: that the principle of male captus
bene detentus is unlikely to be accepted by international criminal adjudicators. It is
telling that neither the OTP nor SFOR were confident enough in the principle to
rely on it other than as, effectively, an alternative argument. This may well be a
realization by the OTP and SFOR that, in the face of the near-universal condem-
nation of the approach in international law as illustrated in the aftermath of the
Alvarez-Machain case,189 thiswouldbea losingbattle.190 Scharf’s conclusion, that ‘an
international criminal tribunal would have to dismiss a case where the defendant
has been abducted in violation of international law’,191 appears to be the correct
one.
Moreover, the issueswhich emerged fromTodorovic´may prove helpful to the ICC
if at some stage its Prosecutor, despairing at the fact that an accused has not been
surrendered despite a state party’s obligation to do so, looks to creative methods of
capture. Itwouldnotbeunimaginable fora scenario todevelopwhereby theSecurity
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UNCharter, determined that international
peace and security was threatened, and established a peacekeeping or enforcement
operationwithamandate to arrest suspects.192 Similarly, nothingwouldprevent the
Security Council from calling on a state to surrender an accused to the ICC or face
187. Art. 89(1) provides that ‘States Parties shall, in accordance with the provision of this Part and the procedure under
their national law, comply with requests for arrest and surrender’ (emphasis added). For a discussion of the
limitations on the obligation of states to surrender accused to the ICC, see S. N. M. Young, ‘Surrendering the
Accused to the International Criminal Court’, (2000) 71 BYIL 317.
188. For a discussion of the obligations of states in relation to the arrest and surrender of individuals indicted by
the ICTY, see Lamb, supra note 90, at 169 et seq.
189. See supra note 105.
190. See notes 110–14 and accompanying text, supra.
191. See Scharf, supra note 107, at 969.
192. Similar to UNTEAS in the Dokmanovic´ case or SFOR in the Todorovic´ or Nikolic´ cases.
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sanctions.193 If, in either situation, an accusedwas arrested contrary to thewishes of
his or her state of residence, the lessons from the ICTY jurisprudence – inconclusive
though they are at this stage – may afford some assistance.
Perhaps themain lesson for the ICCwould be that any body undertaking the task
ofarrestingan individual indictedby it shouldexerciseextremecaution,or theresult
may well be that the ICC will be obliged to release the individual. Depending on
what jurisprudencemay emerge from theNikolic´ case, it may well be that the OTP’s
approach of distancing itself from the arrest process is misguided. It may be wiser
for the ICC to reject this approach in favour of one whereby it becomes involved
from the outset in any proposed action to arrest (in the form of the Prosecutor, the
Registry, or perhaps even the Presidency), in order to ensure its legality and assess
the effect it would have on the eventual trial of the accused.
6. POSTSCRIPT
On2October 2002, after the abovewas finalized, Trial Chamber II of the ICTY issued
aDecisiondismissing themotionbrought byNikolic´ on thebasis of thenature of his
capture.194 TheTrialChamberdivideditsreasoningintotwoparts.First, itconsidered
whether the conduct of the alleged kidnappers could be attributed to SFOR or the
OTP. Because the counsel for Nikolic´ had agreed for the purposes of themotion ‘that
the apprehension and transportation into the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina
was undertaken by unknown individuals having no connection with SFOR and/or
the Tribunal’,195 the Trial Chamber found little difficulty in determining that the
conduct of Nikolic´’s captors could not be attributed to SFOR or the Tribunal.
TheTrial Chamber then consideredwhether ‘the illegal arrest in itself constitutes
adirect obstacle to the exerciseof jurisdictionby theTribunal’,196 andconsidered the
two approaches taken by national case law regarding illegal interstate capture.197
While not specifically endorsing either approach, the Trial Chamber identified
certain ‘core elements’,198 and, based in part on these elements, rejected Nikolic´’s
claims that the FRY’s state sovereigntyhadbeenviolated.199 Further, theTrial Cham-
ber found that ‘theassumed factsprovideno indicia’ either ‘that therewasaviolation
of the human rights of the Accused’ or ‘a violation of the fundamental principle of
due process of law’.200 As with the issue of attributability, we see that the Trial
Chamber’s rejection of Nikolic´’s allegations of the violation of FRY’s sovereignty
193. As the Security Council didwith Libya in the aftermath of the bombing of PanAmFlight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland, by means of Security Council Res. 748 (1992), UN Doc. S/Res/748.
194. Decision on DefenceMotion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal, 9 Oct. 2002.
195. Ibid., at para. 20.
196. Ibid., at para. 70.
197. Ibid., at para. 95.
198. Ibid., at Section VII (Conclusions).
199. It distinguished thecircumstancesof this case fromthenational case lawonthreebases:first, the relationship
of theFRY to theTribunalwasdifferent fromrelationships among states since theTribunal is an enforcement
measure under Chapter VII of theUNCharter; second, unlike in the national cases considered, neither SFOR
nor the OTP was involved in the capture of the accused; and third, unlike in several of the national cases,
with Nikolic´ there was no circumvention of an extradition treaty.
200. Ibid., at Section VII (Conclusions) (following para. 115).
ILLEGAL CAPTURE AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 113
and his human rights and rights to due process were greatly facilitated by Nikolic´
agreeing for the purposes of the motion that neither SFOR nor the OTP had any
involvement in his capture. But for this concession, the matter may well have been
decided differently.
Despite some initial procedural difficulties,201 an appeal by Nikolic´ against this
Decision may very well take place. Moreover, there would appear to be nothing to
prevent his counsel from following Todorovic´’s path and requesting disclosure of
evidence from SFOR and perhaps, ultimately, arriving at a Plea Agreement similar
in nature to that reached by Todorovic´.
201. On 9 Jan. 2003 the Appeal Chamber of the ICTY dismissed an interlocutory appeal by Nikolic´ for procedural
reasons. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber may yet deal with the issues raised if Nikolic´ is able to obtain
consent from the Trial Chamber for an interlocutory appeal (under Rule 73).
